Core parameter overview
- System type
- GNSS navigation deception
- Operation
- Pre-set deception strategies with C2 trigger
- Coverage
- Effective radius 0.5-3 km by model
| Parameter | UB-GS100 | UB-GS300 | UB-GS500 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Effective radius | 0.5 km | 1.5 km | 3.0 km |
| Output power class | 10 W | 30 W | 50 W |
| Antenna | Omnidirectional | Omni or panel | Panel standard |
| Weight | 6 kg | 9 kg | 14 kg |
Typical use: Gentle defeat where kinetic or broadband jamming is undesirable
Related systems in the same defense chain
- UB-FJ Series Fixed Omnidirectional Drone Jammer Station
- UB-GUN Series Portable Anti-Drone Jammer Gun
- UB-BP Series Backpack Counter-Drone Jammer
- UB-VM Series Vehicle-Mounted Counter-UAV System
- UB-RD Series Ku-Band Drone Detection Radar
- UB-RF Series RF Drone Detection And Direction Finder
- UB-EO Series EO/IR Drone Tracking Camera
- UB-HD Series Handheld Drone Detector
- UB-ID Series Integrated Detect-And-Jam Station
- UB-C2 Counter-UAV Command Platform
- UB-NC Series Net-Capture Interceptor Drone
Selection FAQ
How is spoofing different from jamming?
Jamming blocks the drone's GNSS reception so it drifts or lands. Spoofing instead feeds the drone a controlled false position, which can redirect it away from the protected site or force a controlled landing.
Is GNSS deception legal?
GNSS manipulation is tightly regulated in most countries and is generally restricted to authorized government, defense, and critical-infrastructure operators. Compliance review is part of every UB-GS quotation.
Does it affect aviation or phones nearby?
The device is configured with the lowest effective power and, where required, directional antennas. A site frequency plan is prepared so effects stay inside the authorized perimeter.